The purpose of this paper is to examine in greater detail some of the competing explanations for the apparent differential between the rates of return on U.S. foreign assets and liabilities. In particular, we focus on the rate of return on foreign direct investment (FDI). As we show, almost the entire return differential occurs in FDI, where American firms operating abroad appear to earn a persistently higher return than that earned by foreign firms operating in the U.S. We first review a number of explanations in the literature for this differential. We then offer some new evidence on the potential role of income shifting between jurisdictions with varying rates of taxation.
In summary, we do not believe that the differential in returns is an illusion of bad data, as alleged by much of the recent discussion. While the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) --the statistical agency that collects and reports the relevant data --is handicapped by unreliable source data, we believe that the existing accounts it puts together are superior to suggested alternatives.
However, we argue that the current literature places too little emphasis on the potential role for tax-related income shifting. In particular, we find statistically significant evidence of a substantial diversion of income to low-tax jurisdictions, suggesting that the reported earnings on FDI are distorted by efforts to avoid U.S. corporate taxation.
The following section examines the official statistics on the balance of payments (BOP) and the international investment position (IIP) of the United States. Section three discusses the main competing explanations, some of which assert that the official measures are incorrect.
Section four contains our argument on tax considerations. Section five concludes.
What do the published data show?
The official statistics on the U.S. external position are surprising in two respects. First, despite the enormous size of the nation's external indebtedness, the net debt has actually grown more slowly than would have been expected from a simple summation of the annual current account deficits, which are now in the range of $700-800 billion per year. The cumulation of past current account balances would suggest a net liability position of about -$5.5 trillion at the end of 2006, compared to an actual value of -$2.6 trillion (Table 1) .
2 Second, as mentioned above, the United States has experienced no deterioration in its net foreign investment income despite the emergence of the large negative asset position.
These two puzzles raise a number of questions that have direct bearing on the sustainability of the U.S. position. Why have the large current account deficits failed to lead to a larger buildup of net liabilities? What accounts for the missing $2 trillion? And why has the U.S.
continued to do so well on its net investment income? To some observers these two puzzling facts seem inconsistent with the gloom and doom that dominates discussions of the deteriorating U.S. trade position and predictions of a near-term financial crisis.
The Balance of Payments Division of BEA publishes two consistent sets of accounts covering external holdings. The transactions accounts (BoP) provide annual and quarterly data on the normal balance of payments items, including inward and outward investment and the capital income that stems from that investment. The international investment position (IIP) shows the gross asset and liability position of the U.S. In principle, all of the items in both sets of accounts are valued at their current market transaction price. A complication arises with FDI, however, because many foreign affiliates are not actively traded and therefore lack a current market price.
The IIP provides two alternative estimates of FDI at current market value: current cost and market valuation. 3 The current-cost method incorporates market values for the financial components of the IIP but values the tangible asset portion of FDI at current replacement cost using country-specific capital-goods price indexes. This is consistent with the methodology used to value domestic tangible assets in the Federal Reserve's flow of funds accounts. 4 The market valuation concept short-circuits all of the underlying adjustments to balance sheets of foreign affiliates by directly incrementing net equity positions in line with country-specific equity market indexes. In contrast to much of the literature, we choose to emphasize the current cost method in our empirical analysis for two reasons. We find it more consistent with the valuation methods used to compute rates of return on domestic capital. Furthermore, we are uneasy with the derivatives would raise both total foreign assets and liabilities by approximately $1.2 trillion. See Bureau of Economic Analysis (2007).
3 See Landefeld and Lawson (1991) . 4 Tangible assets comprise about one-quarter of foreign affiliates' net stockholder equity.
assumption implicit in the market valuation methodology that changes in the value of foreign affiliates parallel changes in their host country aggregate stock exchanges. It is apparent from the table that valuation effects are larger for equity investments than for either FDI or other assets. The explanation is quite straightforward, reflecting the fact that cash payouts to equity holders (dividends) are only a small portion of the total return.
Furthermore, the valuation effects are larger on the asset side both because U.S. investments in foreign equity markets are somewhat greater than foreign equity investments in the United States and because the foreign market price gains have been larger. The greater surprise is that U.S.
investors appear to have had valuation gains on their other investments (FDI and non-equity), while foreign investments in the U.S. appear to have had substantial valuation losses. 6 A small portion of the difference can be traced to exchange rate effects, but the differences in the nonequity component are largely due to inconsistencies in the source data that the BEA uses to construct the transactions flows and the end of year investment positions. In recent years the surveys have shown larger than expected U.S. holdings of foreign assets and smaller liabilities. The category of other valuation changes reflects breaks in data series and the gain or loss associated with the sale of the interest in a foreign affiliate at a price different than had been recorded in the accounts. While the category is quite large in the aggregate, historical information is not available on its distribution across asset categories. 6 The difference in the valuation adjustment for FDI assets and liabilities may be due in part to divergent trends in capital goods prices. The United States adjusts the price indexes for rapid quality improvements in information technology (IT) capital with the result that the price index for capital goods declines relative to the general GDP deflator. That pattern of relative price change is much less evident in other countries with a smaller role for IT capital.
The second puzzle is illustrated by combining the BoP capital income data with matching measures of assets and liabilities from the IIP so as to compute rates of return for U.S.
investments abroad and foreign investments in the United States. To begin with, we have divided the data into two categories, FDI and all other investments. Surprisingly, figure 2 illustrates that U.S. and foreign investors have earned nearly identical rates of return on non-FDI assets over the past quarter century. Moreover, those returns appear to have declined in line with observed market interest rates. This close correspondence is unexpected in view of the common belief that foreign portfolio investments are concentrated in short-term U.S. government securities with low yields, whereas U.S. investments are relatively concentrated in equities and other high-yield assets. Part of the explanation is that low-yield foreign official holdings are only about 20 percent of total non-FDI liabilities, a smaller share than typically believed. In addition, equities are a large portion of U.S. assets, and as discussed above, cash dividends are a small share of their total yield. The total return, which includes both dividend income and capital gains, is significantly higher. The gap in FDI returns seems to suggest that U.S. firms use their capital more efficiently than their foreign counterparts. If so, it is interesting to ask whether U.S. firms have made unusually high returns abroad, or foreign firms operating in the U.S. have done especially poorly.
As a benchmark measure, figure 3 also shows the after-tax return on domestic nonfinancial corporate capital over 1976-2005. 9 It consistently lies between the estimated returns on outward and inward FDI, suggesting both an above-average return on USDIA and a low reported return for FDIUS. Until recently, most of the discussion and research has focused on the perceived low return on FDIUS. A belief that foreign-controlled corporations operating in the United States were shifting their income abroad in order to avoid U.S. taxation was a significant topic in the 1992 elections, and various explanations for their low returns were frequent topics of research.
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More recently, the discussion has shifted to put a greater emphasis on the high return on USDIA.
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Competing Explanations
The observation that the rates of return on outward and inward FDI differ by a substantial magnitude has been noted by many researchers. The on-going discussion revolves around five alternative explanations: (1) Differing characteristics of USDIA and FDIUS, (2) errors in accounting for exports of U.S. intangibles and a consequent underestimate of the USDIA asset position, (3) errors in the reporting of earnings on USDIA and FDIUS, (4) alternative measures of the return, and (5) tax incentives. We discuss the first four below, leaving the role of taxes to be evaluated in a subsequent section in which we offer some new empirical results.
Differing characteristic of FDI. The sharply differing rates of return on inward and outward FDI are longstanding and frequently noted in the research literature. In the 1990s, the basic assumption was the differences were real, and researchers sought explanations in different characteristics of the enterprises. Most frequently, the differential has either been attributed to the fact that American foreign subsidiaries have been in operation for a longer period of time than foreign subsidiaries in the United States, or to the claim that the risks of doing business may be greater for U.S. firms operating abroad than for foreign firms operating in the United States.
Landefeld and others (1992) reported that firms acquired by foreigners had below average rates of return at the time of purchase; and Grubert and others (1993) found that rates of return did tend to rise in the years following an acquisition within a dataset of individual foreigncontrolled corporations in manufacturing. Mataloni (2000) also found strong maturation effects for a panel of manufacturing companies over the period of 1987-97. However, the size of the age effect is quite small relative to the total gap in the return on inward and outward FDI.
Furthermore, while U.S. firms were investing greater amounts abroad in the years prior to 1980, 10 Mataloni (2000) and Grubert (1997) .
the explosive growth of inward and outward FDI in subsequent years should have rapidly reduced the importance of any initial differences (Gros, 2006b, p. 9) .
The hypothesis that the higher return on outward-FDI is due to the greater riskiness of investing in other countries has been evaluated by Huang and Mascaro (2004) . They show that returns on outward FDI are more volatile and that outward FDI has a considerably higher sovereign risk rating. However, sovereign risk accounts for only about one third of the observed differences in rate of return, and the correlation between returns by country and sovereign risk is not statistically significant.
Neither of these two explanations seems to us sufficient to account for the magnitude and persistence of the differences between the returns on inward and outward FDI. However, Huang and Mascaro argue that taken together, these two effects may account for as much as two-thirds of the reported difference.
Unrecorded Exports of Intangibles. Hausmann and Sturznegger (2006) argue that a persistently higher return on outward relative to inward investment is implausible. They advance an alternative viewpoint that the value of overseas assets are understated because of large exports of intangibles to foreign affiliates that go unreported in official trade data. Trade in intangibles includes transfers of patents, trademarks, and financial assets, as well as more difficult-toquantify concepts such as management and technical know-how. Hausmann and Sturznegger assert that these intangibles cannot be directly measured, but that their magnitude can be deduced by their impact on other flows (i.e. income receipts), similar to the methods used by astronomers to deduce the existence of 'dark matter.' Thus, they capitalize net investment income at an assumed 5 percent rate and compare it to the official IIP. 12 This calculation suggests that the net IIP should be raised by about $3.1 trillion at the end of 2004. A revision of that magnitude would largely eliminate the cumulate current account deficit since 1980.
The Hausmann and Sturznegger assumption of a constant 5 percent return on U.S. assets and liabilities is also implausible. There is no reason for assuming that the return has been constant, much less that it has had a value of 5 percent. However, their analysis does draw attention to the difficulties of accurately measuring the flow of trade in intangibles. Intangibles have no geographic location and can only be defined in terms of the residence of their owners. In principle, the balance of payments includes transactions in intangibles between a parent and its 12 Cline (2005) performs a similar calculation using the ten-year Treasury bond rate.
foreign affiliates, both as part of services trade and as an element of FDI. Yet in practice, the decision of whether or not to transfer ownership to a foreign affiliate is largely independent of any production process or economic transaction. The output of the intangible capital can be attributed to a specific location almost at will. Robert Lipsey (2006) has expressed concern that this 'phantom' production and trade could erode the value of the economic accounts.
The historical cost valuation on the investment position is the cumulative sum of past FDI flows plus accounting adjustments. Thus, any undervaluation of flows would also be incorporated in the firm's balance sheet. In theory, the alternative market valuation of FDI should correct for any systematic undervaluation of the flows. However, most affiliates are privately held and do not trade on organized exchanges. Recall that the BEA estimates a market value for U.S. affiliates by applying the ratio of market value to book value for a broad group of traded corporations in the host country. Thus, there is no built-in correction of asset levels that would adjust for errors in measurement of the flows. On the other hand, critics of the dark matter argument, such as Buiter (2006) and Higgins and others (2007) , point out that no evidence has been presented to suggest that intangibles are a larger element of outward FDI than of the investments of foreign firms in the United States. Furthermore, not everyone agrees that the estimates of the investment income flows are better than those for the investment positions.
Mis-measured Earnings. Daniel Gros (2006a , 2006b ) also believes that the finding of a sustained yield advantage on outward FDI is implausible. But in sharp contrast to Hausmann and Sturznegger, he argues that it is the income data that is wrong. In particular, he focuses on the fact that U.S. firms reinvest a large portion of their earnings on outward FDI, whereas foreign firms report little or no reinvestment of earnings. Second, he believes that the low return on foreign FDI in the United States cannot be reconciled with the fact that the average rate of return on foreign portfolio equity investments is nearly equal to that earned by U.S. investors. In effect, foreigners earn a return comparable to their U.S. counterparts until they invest more than 10 percent in a U.S. corporation -the threshold for the definition of FDI. 13 Gros also rejects tax avoidance as an explanation for the low return on inward FDI. He believes this would imply continuous declines in U.S. export prices relative to import prices, and thus a deterioration in the terms of trade that he does not observe to be true. Instead, he points to the inclusion of reinvested earnings as the source of the difference and favors focusing on dividend repatriation rather than on earnings to compare returns on inward versus outward FDI. explains a large part of the increased focus on the asset and liability positions reported in the IIP. 15 However, the measures of the returns on FDI and other financial assets and liabilities that we described previously exclude those valuation elements.
As discussed earlier in connection with the data in table 1, valuation effects are large and quite favorable to the United States. Table 2 provides a more detailed perspective on the BEA data by separating the total valuation change into three components: asset price changes, exchange rate changes, and other valuation changes due to coverage changes and inconsistencies in the basic source data on stocks and flows. We have consolidated the data for 1990 to 2006 into 14 We present the tax return data in table 3 in the section on tax policy and income shifting.
15 See as well the important research of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2003) to create measures of the IIP for a large number of countries. The importance of wealth valuation effects is also highlighted in Tille (2005) . three comparable subperiods. As shown, the combined revaluations have consistently favored the asset side of the accounts. A large portion of the net change, however, can be traced to revaluations that are due to the 'other valuations' category. The effect of exchange rate changes has been negative over the period as a whole, but it is highly variable. It is also noteworthy that the net effect of price changes varies substantially between the versions with FDI at current and market valuations. Thus, we infer that the greatest differences revolve around the question of how to value FDI, a category for which we have no direct market measure. An important shortcoming of the BEA data is that it is not possible to disaggregate the valuation changes at the level of individual asset categories.
Gourinchas and Rey (2007) For FDI, Gourinchas and Rey exclude the income reported by BEA on both inward and outward FDI and replace it with their measures of the total return derived as explained above from the country-specific equity market indexes. In effect, they switch the focus from a debate about the sources of a differential rate of return on inward versus outward FDI to a focus on the simpler question of whether or not foreign equity markets outperform those of the United States.
In their version of the accounts, the United States earns a slightly higher return on its FDI, but the advantage is substantially smaller than that of non-FDI assets. In striking contrast to the returns shown in figure 2 , the Gourinchas-Rey data show the United States advantage to lie 16 The capital flow data are virtually identical to those of the BEA with some reclassification; and except for FDI, they benchmark their asset positions to those of the BEA in the 4 th quarter of every year. The FDI flows are identical to those of BEA. outside FDI, since it substantially outperforms other countries in its investments in each of the categories of equity, debt, and bank credit. However, we cannot compare their measure of returns, excluding the capital gain or loss, to the income and payments data from BEA because only the total return is reported in their published paper.
The alternative set of international accounts constructed by Gourinchas and Rey reflects an argument similar to that of Gros in that they reject BEA's FDI income data and replace it with a series that largely eliminates any difference in the returns on inward versus outward FDI. The resulting focus on the relative performance of equity markets assumes away the possibility that affiliates may do better or worse than the average firm in the host country. They posit instead an alternative puzzle of why the United States does so well on its non-FDI investments.
We agree with Gourinchas and Rey about the importance of developing effective measures of the total return on international financial investments. However, we do not understand why they went so far in rejecting the BEA data on capital incomes. In addition, Curcuru and others (2007) , using a methodology similar to that of Gourinchas and Rey, conclude that the United States does not earn substantially higher returns within the two categories of bonds and stocks. We favor a less extreme approach in which BEA would publish the three components of the official valuation measure --price change, exchange rate changes, and statistical discontinuities --for each of the major asset categories. Researchers could then use either the nominal or the total return, depending on the specific circumstances.
Tax Policy and Income Shifting
The influence of taxation on decision making by multinational corporations has long been a major topic of economic research. A recent survey by James Hines (1997) highlights the wide range of those studies, and the consistent evidence that taxes do have important consequences. However, most of the studies have focused on the effects of taxation on the location of investments. Less attention has been paid to the issue of greatest interest in the present context: Do firms shift income from the United States to jurisdictions of relatively low tax rates? 18 We are not only concerned about the extent to which tax incentives affect the placement of FDI, but also 18 Huizinga and Laeven (2006) conduct such an analysis for European multinational firms operating within Europe. They find evidence of substantial tax-related profit shifting.
about whether those incentives lead firms to disproportionately assign income to low-tax jurisdictions beyond an amount implied by their investment decisions.
There are two important mechanisms by which firms might shift reported net income.
The first, which has attracted most of the attention, relies on the adjustment of cross-border transfer prices among affiliates within the same corporation. Governments try to control taxinduced transfer price adjustment by requiring the use of prices based on comparable armslength transactions. However, this process involves substantial ambiguities. The second similar mechanism involves the transfer of intangible capital between a parent corporation and its affiliates. The use of the capital, in the form of manufacturing or marketing knowledge, is allocated to affiliates in low-tax jurisdictions at a price below the appropriate arms-length royalty.
Although it is within the U.S. customs union, Puerto Rico is a striking example of the potential for income shifting. Until recently, Section 936 of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 made income earned in Puerto Rico completely exempt from U.S. taxation. The provision was intended to encourage U.S. firms to establish manufacturing facilities on the island --but it also created strong incentives for income shifting. Mainland pharmaceutical firms, for example, correctly reported a low value for raw materials exported to the island and a high value for final products exported from the island. Much of the difference between the two reflected the rent the companies earned on research and development for new patented drugs, the whole of which was attributed to the Puerto Rican affiliates. In effect, R&D expenses were recorded in the United
States where the tax rate was high, while the returns were recorded in Puerto Rico where the tax rate was zero. This income-shifting is estimated to account for a 17-31 percent overstatement of Puerto Rico's GDP in 2004. 19 Grubert and Slemrod (1998) Grubert and Mutti (1991) . Their analysis of the profitability of U.S. affiliates as a function of host countries' statutory tax rates for 1982 found a significant and large negative correlation, implying that firms declared more income in low-tax countries. Similarly, Hines and Rice (1994) analyzed the reports of U.S. nonbank majority-owned affiliates in 1982 and found a negative relationship between local tax rates and profits, controlling for the capital and labor inputs. In the early 1980s, however, the U.S. corporate tax rate was not particularly high relative to those of the countries in which its FDI was concentrated. Thus, it was uncertain whether tax shifting would result in a net reallocation of income away from the United States.
A link to the U.S. parent was provided by Harris and others (1993) 
Related research focused on foreign-controlled corporations operating in the United
States has not found evidence that income shifting is a major contributor to the low reported return on inward FDI. Foreign firms do appear to have consistently earned a below average rate of return over the past quarter century (figure 3). However, Mataloni (2000) found no significant negative correlation between the returns earned by foreign-controlled corporations and their reliance on intra-firm trade. Grubert (1997) used data from U.S. corporate tax returns to examine the behavior of foreign-controlled corporations over the period of 1987-93. 22 He concluded that a large portion of the difference between the returns of foreign-controlled and domestic corporations can be accounted for by non-tax factors. Furthermore, he found that firms with less than 50 percent foreign ownership also had low relative rates of return. Since income-shifting would seem to be more difficult in the presence of other stockholders, he viewed this finding as a significant argument against the hypothesis.
In table 3, we present more recent information on the income of domestic and foreigncontrolled corporations, as shown in the Statistics of Income data of the Treasury (see Hobbs, 2006) . One interesting characteristic is the much higher incidence of negative or zero income among foreign-controlled corporations than domestic corporations (30.2 versus 12.7). This fact plays a dominant role in accounting for the overall difference in the rate of return on net worth between the domestic and foreign-controlled firms (columns 3 and 6). Notably, if the comparison is restricted to firms with positive net income, domestic and foreign firms have roughly equivalent rates of return. However, panel b shows that this restriction has the greatest impact on the comparison of firms in the financial sector (FIRE), where the rate of return of foreign firms is substantially higher. The negative positive earnings differential for domestic relative to foreign firms remains in industries such as manufacturing and wholesale trade.
New results. We re-examine the issue of income shifting using more recent data from the BEA's survey of U.S. multinational corporations. For the years 1999-2004 we have income and balance sheet data for U.S. majority-owned foreign affiliates in 51 countries. We constructed effective tax rates for each country, smoothing the data by taking three-year centered moving averages. 23 We then estimated simple gravity-style equations in which the log of income from country i was related to the log of the country's GDP, the log of its distance from the United States, the ratio of total trade to GDP as a measure of openness, and the effective tax rate.
As shown in figure 4 , the effective tax rate on foreign firms often is quite different from the top statutory domestic tax rate in the host country. 24 These differences reflect other aspects of the tax law, such as depreciation allowances and the common practice of granting preferences to foreign investors. For example, the effective tax measure more clearly highlights the low tax applied to FDI in the Netherlands and Luxembourg. At the same time, it indicates the importance of excluding oil-exporting countries where the effective tax is very high. 25 We also 23 The calculation was suppressed in those situations in which the net income was negative. For 1999 (respectively, 2004) , the tax rate was set equal to the centered three-year average for 2000 (respectively, 2003) . 24 The statutory tax rates are from the World Tax Database compiled by the Office of Tax policy Research at the University of Michigan: http://www.bus.umich.edu/OTPR/otpr/introduction.htm 25 We believe the high effective tax rates reported in oil producing countries may be due to firms' grouping royalty payments in with foreign taxes. Such payments are conceptually quite different from tax payments, and we find a consistent pattern of decline in the effective tax rates between the two subperiods ( figure   5 ). Countries have reacted to the international competition by reducing the taxation of corporations.
How do tax rates abroad compare to those in the U.S.? Table 4 observations, with the caveat that the tax rate is a centered moving average as described above.
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In column 1, the estimated coefficient on tax rate is negative and highly significant, a result that is very much in line with the prior finding that U.S. corporations are sensitive to tax considerations in the allocation of their investments.
Column 2 reports the same specification but with the country-specific stock of direct investment included on the right hand side. 27 Importantly, the tax rate coefficient remains negative and statistically significant even when the accumulated investment stock is controlled for. We interpret this finding as reflective of income-shifting since firms seem to go beyond the simple redistribution of their investments to reallocate income to low-tax jurisdictions. The last three columns repeat the regressions using total affiliates' income and equity, with no adjustment for the U.S. parent's share. The results appear quite robust to this alternative formulation.
We used the regression results of table 5, column (2) to estimate the magnitude of net income shifting. Thus, we show in column (1) of table 6 the level of FDI income that would be predicted each year using each country's effective tax rate, summed over the 51 countries in our therefore exclude the three oil-producing outliers in figure 4 (United Arab Emirates, Norway, and Nigeria) from the regressions reported below.
sample. 28 The same calculation is repeated in column (2) but with every country assumed to have the U.S. tax rate instead of its own effective tax rate. Since the U.S. tax rate consistently exceeds the average tax rate abroad (table 4) , the "predicted income" in column (2) percentage points of the return on FDI assets shown in figure 3 , equal to about one-third of the gap between the return earned on outward investment and the benchmark return of nonfinancial corporate capital.
Conclusion
Whether the United States can continue to earn positive or near-zero net investment income will have a direct impact on the size of the current account imbalance over the short to medium term. The fact that the U.S. has done so to date, despite a large and growing net international indebtedness position, has provoked a stream of research on the sources of the rate of return differential. Such explanations have focused on observable characteristics of firms, data quality issues, and the importance of including valuation changes in the measure of the return.
We argue here that tax-induced income shifting is an important part of the story. Using country-specific income and tax data, we find that about one-third of the excess return earned by U.S. corporations abroad can be explained by firms reporting "extra" income in low tax jurisdictions of their affiliates. We caution, however, against more extreme attempts to reconcile the return puzzle by restating the official balance of payments figures. The official data may exaggerate the U.S. FDI premium, but its size and persistence suggest that the return differential is quite real.
28 Due to data limitations the number of countries included was below 51 in some years. 29 The geographical distribution of direct investment income is reported without a current cost adjustment and net of withholding taxes. In 2004 these adjustments reduced aggregate income earned on direct investments abroad by $23 billion.
We conclude by stressing the importance of the BEA's expanding the accounts to document the separate contributions of price changes, exchange rate changes and revaluations at the level of individual asset categories. At least three research papers (Curcuru et al, 2007 , Gourinchas-Rey, 2007 , and Tille, 2003 Source: authors' calculations from sources given in figure 1 and Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States . The domestic corporate rate of return is for nonfarm nonfinancial corporations, and it is defined as the sum of after-tax economic profits and net interest as a percent of tangible assets. 
